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"IN THIS CORNER, GENTLEMEN-"
OMETIME ago Dicta received the following interesting suggestion from one of its "constant readers", to-wit,
the following:
"For Dicta to be useful, it must be interesting; and to be interesting, it
must be human and not shrink from controversial subjects or confine itself
entirely to heavy and sometimes somewhat dull articles.
Its function is not only informative but to be a medium of entertainment,
fellowship and stimulus as well.
Now there are many points of view on many subjects among the five
hundred and more good minds in the Denver Bar.
Why not encourage them to use "Dicta" as a sort of open forum through
which they can let off their steam and thus make it a magazine not of mere
oppressive dignity but one of sprightly, snappy family interest?
For example, suppose some contributor thinks he has a panacea for the
alleged crime wave, believes that short skirts are the root of all modern evil,
fancies that the church temperance society is wrecking the government, or
believes that the automobile ought to be abolished by constitutional amendment.
Any one of these things or a thousand and one others would provoke
discussion and perhaps acrimonious argument. But what of it?
The more of it the merrier! It will wake us up and keep the dust and
cobwebs out of our legal brains."

On pondering over the above communication, Dicta arrived at the following conclusions:
First: That the reference to five hundred or more good
minds in the Denver Bar was perhaps over-enthusiastic, but
there could be no doubt that at least that many points of view
exist on any given topic, regardless of its nature.
Second: That the entire idea possessed great merit.
These conclusions had not long been reached when the
opportunity for action arrived, in the form of the following
letter to the editor:
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"Dear Sir and Brother:
There comes a time in the life of every lawyer, when he must either blow
off steam or run the risk of apoplexy, and as I have never experienced, and am
not seeking to experience, apoplexy, I take the alternative.
Recently some of the judges of our courts of record have refused to
enter Findings of Fact in divorce cases where it appeared that the parties had
not been married for a year or more prior to the hearing, notwithstanding the
plaintiff may have had, and proved, perfectly good grounds for divorce, and
was entitled to findings under the statute. More recently, it was reported in
the newspapers that one of our District Judges had announced that it was to
be his policy to refuse to enter findings under such circumstances until the
year had passed.
It may be that the judges are able to justify such proceedings in their
own minds, as a matter of public policy, and it may be that their ideas about
public policy are right, but, if the inquiry is not too impertinent, what of the
law and of the oaths the judges have taken-to support and defend the constitution and faithfully perform their duties, which I conceive to be the impartial application of the law to the facts of a particular case. There is no
mention of public policy in the oath, and I have searched the constitution and
statutes in vain for a provision transferring the determination of the public
policy of the state from the legislature to the courts. I have even pried the
sheepskin from the covers of the statute books, and peered within the dark
recesses, but "It ain't there, Brother". I did find, however, a provision in the
constitution requiring the judges of the District Court to suggest to the judges
of the Supreme Court, on or before July 1st of each year, such changes in
the law as they may deem necessary or desirable, which Court in turn is
required to transmit its suggestions to the legislature.
Under our divorce statute no writ of error will lie to review such a
proceeding in the Supreme Court, and mandamus, involving as it does the
element of discretion, is of doubtful value. There remain but two other
avenues of relief. The lawyer, if he doesn't like it, can hire a band and have
a parade. His client, if she is not satisfied, can drink the hemlock.
Perhaps other members of the bar may have something to suggest. I
should like to have the matter discussed, editorially, with dignity and moderation or otherwise, in Dicta."

Such being the statement of the case, Dicta will now proceed to discuss the same "editorially, with dignity and moderation, or otherwise".
It is a sad and regretable fact that many of our public
servants have, in these softer and decadent times, fallen away
from that stern and rigid adherence to truth, the law and the
facts, which, for example, caused the reporter of the first
volume of our C6lorado Reports, in his preface, to state,
irrespective of policy, the stark facts, as follows:
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"All dissenting opinions will be found in their connection, and when the
bench was not full, the fact is noted."

It is also true that a great deal of inconvenience and annoyance is caused to a sweet young thing by the discovery that
the gentleman on the bench has made Mr. Kipling's "-the
woman that God gave him isn't his to give away", bilateral,
so to speak. It is also true, and perhaps not unfortunate that,
in the popular mind at least, a successful divorce plea depends
more on the weight of the plaintiff than upon the weight of
the evidence.
However, perhaps one of the most potent reasons supporting the attitude of the courts now under discussion is the
feeling that such an attitude may have a tendency to discourage too hasty and whimsical marriage. If the rumor spreads
abroad that a marriage means a minimum of a year of connubial bliss, perhaps the result will be a beneficial retardation. Against this, however, is the counter-argument, of undoubted weight, that under modern conditions, although a
young man may not have known a girl as long a time as would
have been deemed a requisite in the older, gentler days, yet
he will have seen much more of her.
Dicta has not delved deeply into the books on the point of
the power of the court to control its actions by the imposition
of standards set up by its own construction of public policy.
There is no question, however, that the court is sworn to uphold the constitution and to impartially apply and determine
the law, even though the application be personally distasteful.
There is also considerable basis to argue that Sec. 5406 of
C. L. 1921, as amended in S. L. 1925, page 237, makes it mandatory upon the court to make and sign written findings of
fact and conclusions of law within forty-eight hours of the
conclusion of the trial. However, public policy may often
shift or change the meaning or application of an apparently
plain provision-"A word is not a crystal * * * but the skin
of a living thought". For example, every attorney who has
taken his oath as such has sworn, among other things: "I will
not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I
believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land".
And the courts are charged with the duty of disciplining in-
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fractions. Yet what lawyer would not resent being stopped
short in his oratory by the court, on the grounds that he had
alleged that his position was so strong as to be undebatable,
and thereby had violated his oath and become subject to discipline.
It is the function of public policy and judicial discretion
to check weasel words from creating destruction. Life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness are sacred, and no court can
lightly encroach upon these inalienable rights. But, of course,
it all depends upon whose rights, or rather, upon a balance of
everybody's rights. For every predatory divorcee, hastily released by a kindly court, some hitherto protected individual
must count a portion of his constitutional guarantees of life,
liberty and happiness (though not the pursuit) dissipated and
imperiled to that extent. On the other hand, for every finding and decree denied, life, liberty and the legal pursuit are,
to that extent, curtailed as to one, or maybe both, of the now
embattled spouses.
As to the two avenues left upon the denial of the judicial
signature and findings, namely, for the attorney to hire a band
and have a parade and the client to drink the hemlock,there again the situation is, alas!, clouded. You no longer
may have a parade without sanction from the City Fathers.
And even then, you must have union musicians or the labor
forces will descend upon you. Nor can the good old hemlock
be as easily drunk as in the olden, golden days. Alas, even
what one drinks may involve questions of the construction of
constitutional limitations and public policy.
All in all, Dicta feels the best remedy for the curbed and
fiery feminine petitioner is to machine-gun her erring spouse,
stand a murder trial, syndicate her reactions, and, upon acquittal, marry the man she wanted in the first place. This system is simple; it is definite; it is permanent; it is far more
speedy than the usual divorce method; and it conclusively
silences protest from the ex-defendant in divorce. No appeals
are possible. The publicity and wide friendships built up
by the murder trial, if well managed, will yield substantial
returns in lucre and proposals. And so will come the dawn!
Dicta, however, is willing to hear further upon this point
if its subscribers are desirous thereof.

IN RE: THE MOURNERS
By Mary F. Lathrop of the Denver Bar
HIS fragmentary and casual comment on some of the
infirmities and eccentricities of our present statutes is
an endeavor to arouse interest in codification of our
Probate Law.
In its devious wanderings from Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson's codification of the ecclesiastical law has been
amended and altered, via the common law and the law that
never was on sea or land, by legislators whose zeal outran
their knowledge.
To illustrate: Section 5154 C. L. 1921 provides for
inheritance by children of the half blood, and descendants of
children of the half blood. Unexplainable, except by Pope's
line as to "The child whom many fathers share."
The legislature of 1927 provided that gifts to charity
should continue to be gifts to charity by enacting that no gifts
to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses "should
be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty
of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the
instrument creating or constituting the same." S. L. 1927,
page 737, Sec. 1.
Yet long ago, Mr. Pomeroy wrote in his "Equity Jurisprudence"; "Charitable trusts are those created for the benefit
of an unascertained,uncertain,and sometimes fluctuating body
of individuals, in which the cestui que trustent may be a portion or class of a public community."
Mr. Alexander says: "A trust cannot be charitable where
the beneficiaries are definitely designated. And again, charitable trusts are further distinguished from private trusts in
that the beneficiaries are uncertain." (Alexander on Wills
Sec. 1113.)
Colorado's most urgent need is a statute providing for
short time settlement of estates of less than $2,000.00 in value.
Other commonwealths provide for such settlements in 30 or
60 days from the issuance of letters, requiring the executor or
administrator to produce receipts for funeral expenses and
expenses of the last illness. Speedy closing statutes are in
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force in many states where the husband or widow is the sole
surviving heir at law.
Some states provide for surety bond of the value of the
estate; said bond to be in force for one year.
Provision should also be made for short time settlement
of claims for expenses of the last illness, say, ninety days, or
six months at most.
In Virginia, California, and a number of other states
holographic wills are valid and sufficient to transfer real and
personal property. Under our statutes, Sec. 5210 C. L. 1921,
such wills are ineffective, though properly probated in the
state of testator's residence. The statute should be amended
to provide that when any last will and testament or codicil
thereto is effective in law for the giving, granting, devising,
and bequeathing of the real and personal estate therein and
thereby devised and bequeathed, said will upon its admission
to probate by the County Court of the proper county, shall be
good and sufficient to transfer and convey all real and personal
estate situate in this State.
The legislature of 1921 (S. L. 1921, p. 818, Sec. 1), added
a confusing and uncertain amendment to Sec. 5210.
It purports to give authority to foreign executors and
trustees to convey or mortgage real estate;
"When a certified copy of the letters testamentary or trusteeship issued
under said will, testament or codicil by such foreign court or tribunal have
been filed for record with the clerk and recorder of the county wherein are
situated the lands to be conveyed or administered under the terms of said will,
* * * the executor, trustee or other representative appointed * * * by such
foreign court or tribunal, may execute such instruments of conveyance or
mortgage, or contracts concerning such lands as are in accordance with the
powers conferred by said will * * * upon such executor, trustee or representative and without letters testamentary having been issued in this state and
without any order of court for the execution of such powers."

Note that the section does not provide for a certificate that
the letters testamentary are still in full force and effect; where
land is in more than one county, does not provide for recording
a copy of the will and its foreign and domestic orders of probate. It provides for certified copies of letters of trusteeship.
Given power in and by the will, or trust agreement, foreign executors and trustees, always have had power to sell and
convey, after the probate and recording of the will, or record-
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ing of the trust agreement, in the foreign commonwealth. The
provision as to trustees raises the question of the powers of
probate courts in Colorado over trustees.
Article VI, Sec. 23, of the State Constitution limits the
powers of the County Court;
"Provided, such court shall not have jurisdiction in any case where the
debt, damage, or claim, or value of property involved, shall exceed two thousand dollars, except in cases relating to the estates of deceased persons."

When the debts (including taxes), legacies and expenses
of administration are paid, the bondsmen are entitled to be
released, the executors discharged, and the estate closed. The
estate then has ceased. The trust begins to function, as a trust,
and the method of its creation, by will or agreement, is immaterial. The limitation on the jurisdiction of the County Court
is applicable in either case.
This is emphasized in Colorado by the provision of Section 5204, C. L. 1921, which in terms makes the will a conveyance, passing title to the devisee upon the probate and recording thereof, by providing that it,
"shall be good and available in law, for the granting, conveying, and assuring the lands, tenements and hereditaments, annuities, rents, goods, and
chattels therein and thereby given, granted, devised, and bequeathed."

Has the County Court jurisdiction of testamentary trusts
by virtue of the last clause of Section 5364 of the Compiled
Laws of 1921? Can the legislature enlarge the constitutional
powers of the Court?
In the Girard will cases the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania answered in the negative. Until a new constitution enlarged the powers of the Orphans' Court, the Girard Estate
was kept open with administrators d. b. n., c. t. a., that reports
might be filed with the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in
accordance with the requirements of the will.
The authority of executors to sell real estate under power
conferred by will is limited by S. L. 1915, page 490, Sec. 6,
(C. L. Sec. 5242), as follows:
"such executor or administrator shall before making any sale under such
authority apply to the court for an order authorizing such sale, and upon
obtaining such order shall give bond * * * and no sale by such executor * '0
shall be valid unless a bond as aforesaid shall be first given and approved by
the court."
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Chief Justice Shaw held in Going v. Emery, 16 Pick
(Mass.) 107, 113; 26 Amer. Dec. 645, 647, as follows:
"And whenever an executor has power under a will to sell real estate,
no license of any court is necessary to, or can give any additional validity to
any sale and conveyance which he may make. And it is considered a good
reason for refusing such license, that the power already exists."

Section 5211, C. L. 1921, Paragraph "Second" provides
for the construction of a will before it has been admitted to
probate, and the admission to probate;
"in so far as it shall be found valid and binding, and it shall be executed only
in so far as its contents may be held valid and binding," etc.

As a scheme for delaying the settlement of estates, and
obtaining inadequate construction, this is an unbeatable law.
It is of course important that the will be probated, the
executor take charge, file inventory, inheritance tax schedules,
pay debts, etc. Questions of construction of trusts frequently
require months of careful technical briefing. Our statute provides for appeal to the district court and trial de novo. This
means duplication of work, more delay, additional expense.
The question of construction is purely an equitable matter
and the tested method of admitting the will to probate and
filing suit for construction as necessity requires should be used.
Section 5198, C. L. 1921, provides that the citation to
attend the probate of a will, shall,
"be served upon all persons necessary to be served residing in the State of
Colorado in the .same manner as summons is served in Civil proceedings under
the Code of Civil procedure of the State of Colorado,"

Section 40 of the Code provides:
"Tenth-If suit be brought against a minor under the age of fifteen
years, the summons shall be served by delivering a copy of the writ to him
personally, also a copy to his or her father, mother or guardian, or if there
be none such in the state, then by delivering a copy to any person having care
or control of such minor, or with whom he or she resides, or in whose service
he or she is employed."

But Section 5301, C. L. 1921, requires the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for such minor, and contains a mandatory
provision that the probate shall not be heard unless the
guardian ad litem shall appear.
Why the necessity, therefore, of serving parents, employers, custodians, etc. of minors?

THE WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE
By Hugh McLean of the Denver Bar
appears that another legal landmark is about to be submerged in the rising tide of dollars, and that the horse has
lost to Ford and General Motors another traditional post
of honor. If House Bill No. 548, now before our Legislature,
becomes a law, no more will our Colorado widows be permitted to console themselves with "one cow and calf, one
saddle and bridle, one horse" each, as for so many years they
have done under Sec. 5347 C. L. 1921 and its predecessors.
No more shall we behold appraisers, court-appointed for that
sole purpose, solemnly determining the value of horses, cows
and calves which exist only on paper, to-wit: the appraiser's
warrant, and of six months' provisions and fuel (Sec. 5915
C. L. 1921) which cannot be found in the larder or coal-bin
of our modern widow, who, conveniently situated in a steamheated, frigidaired, piggly-wigglyed apartment, lives from
can to mouth. Nor will the clerk hereafter scan and total the
figures which our accommodatingly imaginative appraisers
have placed on these hypothetical animals, provisions, beds
and pictures, to see that the total exactly equals, but does not
exceed, the sacred statutory figure, two thousand dollars.
Hereafter, under the new law, it is assumed that the widow,
unless she expressly declares to the contrary, will accept
nothing but hard cash in payment of her allowance.
This proposed statutory revision, and several comparatively recent decisions of our Colorado Supreme Court, have
suggested this brief and quite unscholarly note on the purpose,
nature and incidents of this so-called widow's allowance,.under
our statute and decisions.
1. The widow's allowance is not an interest in the estate,
passing by descent, but a preferred claim against the estate,
to be paid out of the personal property, if sufficient, if not,
from the real estate. Grover v. Clover, 69 Colo. 72 (1917).
2. Allowance by the court constitutes a judgment in
favor of the widow againstthe administrator; the money is
no longer in custodia legis; the administrator by the judgment
becomes a debtor, and is subject to garnishment in attachment
proceedings against the widow. Nothing in the statute ex-
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empts the allowance from garnishment, and the court declines
to determine or even discuss the question of public policy
involved, these questions being legislative, not judicial. Dry
Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank, 75 Colo. 451 (1924).
3. Only a widow "residing in this state" is entitled. For
example, in Bubser v. Hermann, 71 Colo. 95 (1922), three
years before the husband's death, the wife had removed to
Iowa and remained there until his death. She neither corresponded with the husband, nor received any support from
him, but made her own way by operating a rooming-house.
Held: Widow's allowance denied. While the legal domicile
of the wife may, for certain purposes, be that of the husband,
she may have, and did have here, a separate residence. She
was residing apart from the husband, discharging no duties
toward him, and was maintaining herself; therefore the reason
of the statute to provide after the husband's death for her, who
before his death had been dependent on him, fails. "The
thing for which the allowance is a substitute not having existed, there is no reason for the allowance."
4. The allowance may be waived by antenuptial or separation agreement; but the waiver must be explicit and will
not be implied from general language.
Here we have an interesting series of cases, showing considerable difference of opinion in the court. In chronological
order they are as follows:
In Wilson v. Wilson, 55 Colo. 70 (1913), the husband and
wife made an antenuptial agreement providing that neither
should inherit from the other, and that the survivor "shall not
claim any interest whatever in the estate of the deceased party
by virtue of said marriage." The husband further agreed
that a reasonable portion of his estate should be held in trust
by his executors to support the wife in as comfortable a manner as during the marriage. The husband died and the wife
claims the widow's allowance. Held: Allowance granted.
The widow's allowance is a claim, not an interest in the estate.
The contract relates only to the widow's distributive share; its
general provisions do not waive the widow's allowance, especially in view of the later clauses expressly providing for
her support. She no more waived her claim under the statute
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than she would have waived her claim on her husband's promissory note, if she had held one.
In Deeble v. Alerton, 58 Colo. 166 (1914), the husband
and wife, after living together for thirty years, executed a
separation agreement providing that neither would claim from
the other any money or property and that neither should be
liable for the support or debts of the other. The husband
died; the wife claims her widow's allowance. Held: Allowance granted. The contract does not waive the widow's allowance, which is designed to protect widows and children and
the State as well. It cannot be waived by presumption, assumption or construction. If it may be waived at all it must
be in terms that do not admit of doubt.
In Remington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132 (1922), a contract between husband and wife recited that for sufficient considerations the wife waived and released all rights in the husband's property, including her right to inherit from him; that
he should have the right to dispose of all of his property by
will, and if he did not do so it should descend to his legal heirs
other than the wife. On the husband's death the wife claims
the widow's allowance. Held: Allowance granted. The
subject matter of the contract was property, whereas the widow's allowance is neither an interest in the property of the
husband nor is it an interest in his estate. It is a charge against
the estate, part of the costs of administration, and is a right
given by statute on grounds of public policy.
In Brimble v. Sicker, 83 Colo. 494 (1928), the husband
and wife, both elderly, were married in 1914. Four months
later they executed a written agreement forthwith to separate;
and in consideration of $150 and some chickens, the wife
agreed not to claim support, nor alimony if divorce should
later be had. Each further agreed to waive any claims to
moneys, property or assets that might be due from the estate
of the other "as widow or husband or heir or in any other
manner." They remained undivorced, living apart, until
1926, when the husband died. The wife claimed her widow's
allowance. Held: Allowance denied. The wife expressly
waived the only claim she had as widow, viz, the widow's
allowance, which is alienable and may be garnisheed after
allowance. The basic public policy involved is the duty of
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the husband to support the wife-here there was none. Walker
J. specially concurred, and Adams, Campbell and Whitford
JJ. dissented, on the ground that public policy is fixed by the
legislature, not by the court; that the State is a party, and its
rights cannot be contracted away. The basic reason for the
allowance is that the wife may have something to live on after
the husband is dead, so that the State will not have to support
her. The inadequacy of the consideration here shown emphasizes the need of protecting the wife.
In U. S. National Bank v. Stuart, 83 Colo. 546 (1928),
the husband and wife, each over sixty years of age at the time
of their marriage, and each having separate property, made
an antenuptial contract providing that neither should acquire
any interest "in the property of the other by virtue of their
marriage, or any rights arising therefrom including inheritance." Some years after marriage this antenuptial contract
was reaffirmed in a writing which recited "we have each a
sufficient amount of property to support ourselves comfortably the rest of our lives." On the husband's death the wife
claimed her widow's allowance, which was granted by the
County Court. On writ of error to the Supreme Court, one
justice not sitting, the remaining six were equally divided,
wherefore the judgment of the County Court was affirmed
by operation of law.
In view of the decided and fundamental differences of
opinion among the judges, might it not be desirable for the
legislature more explicitly to define the right involved? As
matters now stand under the latest authoritative pronouncement of the Court in the Brimble v. Sicker case, (83 Colo.
494), the widow's allowance is to be treated merely as a preferred claim against the estate, subject to garnishment, and
capable of being waived by express contract. This gives the
wife a right which she can use to bargain with in connection
with antenuptial contracts or separation agreements. If, on
the other hand, as the minority of the court seem to think, it
should be treated in the light of a spendthrift trust for the
widow, for her protection and that of the state, then further
legislation is necessary. Such paternalistic protection seems,
on the whole, neither necessary nor desirable.

TAXATION OF ESTATES PENDING
PROBATE
By Joseph P. Constantine of the Denver Bar
PHASE that is generally overlooked by an attorney
during the probate of an estate is the question of taxation. How often has an attorney about to close an
estate, and as a matter of fact having the final report ready
to be approved, been confronted with a claim made by the
assessor for taxes. levied on the property'? Also it is quite
shocking not to say embarrassing if, after painstaking work,
the day's mail brings a statement of taxes due. Then with
certain proper self-addressed declarations we sit and wonder
how the assessor obtained the information on which the tax
is based.
A former judge of the County Court once declared himself to the effect that if the assets of an estate consisted of seven
hundred dollars the estate is taxed on that sum; whereas if an
individual possesses a like amount it is a mere question of
policy with the latter whether or not he shall make a correct
return to the assessor for the purpose of taxation.
In order to have a better understanding of the method,
and there is a method in this madness, pursued by the assessor
in levying a tax we must familiarize ourselves to some extent
with the various sections of the Revenue Laws since they are
used in fixing the valuation of an estate. In this article we
treat only with intangible assets since they form the majority
of estate taxation cases.
The following sections of the Statutes are the ones considered by the assessor in determining the valuation of an
estate:

A

Section 7231 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. in ascertaining the
amount of moneys of any taxpayer, or the moneys by such taxpayer invested
in merchandise or manufactures, the assessor shall ascertain the average amount
during the fiscal year for which the tax is to be levied; and the average amount
of such moneys and the average value of such merchandise or manufactures
during the twelve months ending with the thirty-first day of March of such
fiscal year shall be taken as a true measure of the average amount of moneys
and the value of such moneys invested in merchandise or manufactures for
such fiscal year.
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Section 7232 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. In listing the moneys,
credits and moneys invested in merchandise and manufactures, the person
making the list shall state the average of such moneys and credits and the
average value of money invested in merchandise or manufactures, during each
calendar month of the year ending with the thirty-first day of March of the
then current year. If he has not been a resident of the County or has not
been engaged in the business of merchandising so long, then he shall take the
average during such time as he may have been so engaged; and if he be commencing, he shall take the amount of money or the value of the property on
hand at the time of the listing.
Section 7233 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. In listing the credits,
the person making a list shall set down the aggregate cash value of all promissory notes, bonds, debentures or other written evidences of indebtedness. In
stating the amount due him on book accounts or other accounts not evidenced
by writing he shall set down the aggregate cash value thereof.
Section 7236 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. In listing the amount
of notes and credits held by him, the person making such schedule may deduct
therefrom the amount of all his debts, but not including any liability to any
insurance company for premiums on policies, or on account of any subscription
to any literary, scientific, charitable or other like institution or society, or on
account of any subscription due or indebtedness payable upon or for the capital
stock of any company, whether incorporated or unincorporated, or for the
purchase of any bonds or treasury notes or other securities of the United States
not taxable, or other exempt property, or for or on account of any obligations
signed by such party as surety for another, nor any acknowledgment of indebtedness not found on actual consideration, or made for the purpose of being
so deducted; and the party making such return and demanding any abatement
upon credits by reason of any indebtedness, shall set down in a separate statement all liabilities in respect whereof a deduction is claimed.
Section 7249 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. All personal property
within this state on April 1st in the then current year shall be listed and
assessed in the county where it shall be on said April first.
Section 7252 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. All credits arising
from the deposit of money, checks, drafts or other cash items in any bank or
banking institution, either state or national, including savings banks, trust
companies, or other corporations so receiving deposits in any form, shall be
subject to assessment like other personalty; the assessment shall not be made
on credits as they exist in favor of any creditor on any day certain, but the
assessor shall ascertain as near as may be the average credits for the year for
which the assessment is made, and assess the average thereof. The assessor
may examine the creditor under oath in reference to such average credits; and
upon such information or other information obtainable, the assessor shall make
the assessment of such credits. This section shall apply to all residents of this
state who have made deposits outside the limits of this state, and all such
credits are assessable in this state the same as deposits made within the state.
Section 7180 Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. Taxes for the current
year shall be payable as now provided by law, provided however, that at any
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time after the lien of taxes has attached and the County Treasurer for any
reason believes that taxable property will or may be removed from his jurisdiction or may be dissipated or distributed so that taxes on the same for the
current year cannot be collected, then and in that event, the treasurer shall
at once collect the full amount of taxes on said personal property for the
current tax year and if necessary may make the same together with all penalties
and costs by distraint and sale of said personal property.

The theory followed by the assessor in levying a tax on
an estate is that the estate is a continuation of the decedent's
business for the purpose of winding up his affairs and while
there are assets belonging to the estate they are subject to
taxation the same as the property of a person in esse. The
assessor gleans the information upon which the estate is taxed
from the Inventory, which is a part of the estate records, filed
in the office of the Clerk of the County Court. Sometimes
a resort is made to the files in the office of the Inheritance Tax
Commissioner where a more detailed report is available.
In order to determine what securities are taxable it is well
to mention briefly the securities that are tax exempt either by
federal legislation or by state law.
Liberty Bonds are exempt from taxation because they are
issued by the National Government and to lexy a tax on these
bonds would be a restraint on the operation of a law constitutionally passed by congress. Similarly, any debentures or
credits issued in the name of the United States are likewise
exempt. This principle was established early in the history
of the United States in the opinion given by Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, wherein it was decided that to levy a tax on government
stocks or bonds would be to tax the power to borrow money on
the credit of the United States.
Bonds, notes and mortgages secured by property within
the State of Colorado are likewise exempt. Securities issued
by the State of Colorado, or any municipality situated therein,
or any irrigation district, school district or improvement district are exempt from taxation. The principle underlying this
doctrine is similar to the law applicable to a bond or debenture
of the federal government except that it is only state wide in
scope.
Bonds issued by a corporation incorporated under the
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laws of the State of Colorado, or any corporation formed under the laws of any foreign state but whose physical property
is located within the State of Colorado are not subject to taxation. The tangible property of a corporation is reflected partly in the bonds issued, which in turn are represented by its
property holdings and equipment and a property tax is levied
on the latter.
Stocks of any corporation or association whether located
within or without the State of Colorado are exempt from
taxation. The physical property of a corporation or association is represented by the stock it issues and a tax is levied on
such physical property. To levy a tax on the stock and also on
the physical property of a corporation or association would be
double taxation and this principle was settled in the case of
City and County of Denver v. Hobbs Estate, 58 Colorado 522.
Mortgages secured by real estate or chattels located within the State of Colorado are exempt from taxation by statute.
The tax in such cases is levied on the physical property by
which they are secured and to tax both the property and the
security would be double taxation. This applies to promissory notes that are secured. The leading case on this matter
is Washington County v. Murray, 71 Colorado 522, where the
Court held that to tax a mortgage and the property by which
the mortgage was secured would be double taxation and inconsistent with the spirit of the law.
Where a bequest is made to a charitable organization or
institution it appears that the whole legacy is exempt from taxation. The statutes provide that the property of religious and
charitable institutions are exempt from taxation and any donations or gifts made to such in furtherance of their objects
are exempt. Since a will speaks from the instant a person dies
any legacy left to a charitable organization is impressed with
a charitable character and therefore not subject to taxation.
This was settled in the case of Bishop and Chapter of St. John
Evangelist v. City and County of Denver, 37 Colorado 378.
The Supreme Court later held that a charitable organization
need not be public but may be private and still retain the
benefits of the exemption laws in the case of Horton v. Colorado Springs Masonic Building Society, 64 Colorado 529.
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This leaves the matter of bonds issued by a foreign state
or corporation, mortgages and notes secured by property outside the State of Colorado, unsecured notes, accounts receivable, money and various other classes of personalty subject to
assessment.
In brief a bond, note or mortgage is considered as a negotiable instrument and treated as a credit or cash item for the
purpose of taxation. While the state in which the bond was
originally issued might have provided that the bond should
be exempt from taxation it is well settled by numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court that a law has no
extra-territorial effect and another state need take no cognizance of such a law.
Bonds, accounts receivable, notes secured by property
outside the state and unsecured notes are listed in the aggregate
value as of April first of the current tax year. Any credits
arising from the deposit of money or other cash items in any
bank or banking institution are averaged for the twelve month
period ending with March thirty-first and the average amount
is taken for the purpose of taxation in accordance with Sections 7231, 7232 and 7252 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado
1921.
Quite frequently an attorney in his zeal to save an estate
any liability for taxes by reason of cash on deposit in a bank
petitions the Court for an order authorizing his client to
invest the money on hand in Liberty Bonds or other tax exempt
securities. This is done a few days before April first of the
current tax year. However, since no attention is paid to the
statute that provides that money is not taxed as a credit existing on any particular day but that the average is taken for the
preceding twelve month period the attorney is dumbfounded
when his client receives a statement for taxes on the very thing
he tried to avoid.
Thus if a taxpayer had ten thousand dollars in deposit in
a bank for eleven months of the twelve month period ending
with March thirty-first of the then current tax year and the
same sum was invested in Liberty bonds on March first, it
would be an evasion of taxes to say that since the taxpayer had
no money on deposit on April first he should not be taxed on
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the cash deposit that was in existence for the eleven month
period. In such a case the last month would be omitted and
the average monthly balance would be properly taxable.
In the matter of the proceeds of a life insurance policy
payable to the estate the same is properly taxed if received
prior to April first of the current tax year in accordance with
the principles enunciated previously. The money would be
prorated for the time it had been on hand. If it is not received prior to April first then it is treated as an account
receivable.
Having determined the total amount of taxable property
which the estate has on hand the next thing we are concerned
with is the matter of deduction of debts. These are computed
as in the case of an individual and more specifically set forth
in Section 7252 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921. If
a person departs this life after April first there is a hardship
imposed on his estate for in such a case the decedent is entitled
to a deduction of debts that actually existed on March thirtyfirst of the then current tax year; whereas if a person dies
prior to April first he is entitled to a deduction of all his debts
such as funeral expenses, costs of administration and all debts
and expenses enumerated in the five classes of claims allowed
against an estate. However, a tax that has been imposed or
levied on any property is not a legitimate deduction as the
Courts have held that a tax is not a debt founded on actual
consideration but one of the incidents of government which an
individual must pay in return for the many advantages and
protection given him.
Frequently an attorney will receive a notice or statement
of taxes due which appears to be quite high and not consistent
with the true condition of the estate. The reason for this is
apparent. Since the attorney has not filed a schedule with the
assessor wherein a list of the assets and liabilities were enumerated the assessor used the best information he had on hand,
which in most cases would be the inventory of the estate. In
such cases an adjustment is readily made by the assessor. If
this discrepancy is called to the attention of the assessor and
he is furnished with a list containing the various assets and
a list setting forth the liabilities before the Tax Roll is delivered to the Treasurer on January first, the correction may
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be made by the assessor sua sponte. If the matter is not noticed
until after the warrant has been delivered to the Treasurer
there are two methods by which the correction may be made.
If the amount involved is less than fifty dollars in taxes the
assessor may make the correction. If the amount involved
exceeds fifty dollars in taxes then it becomes necessary to file
a petition with the Board of County Commissioners asking
for an abatement of taxes and setting forth in the petition
wherein the assessment complained of is erroneous.
Oftentimes an estate is closed after April first and prior
to the time fixed by law for the collection of taxes for the
fiscal year. In such cases we feel that an injustice is being
done in requiring the payment of taxes on the assets remaining
on hand. According to Section 7249, C. L. 1921, the lien for
taxes attaches on all property on April first. As long as the
estate is intact and no distribution is made there will be no
attempt to collect the taxes. In case of distribution the assets
will be scattered and the probability of collecting the tax from
the distributees is nil and in accordance with the provisions
of Section 7180, C. L. 1921, the tax is collected on the assessed
valuation as fixed by the assessor.
It is well to bear in mind that the laws of Colorado are
not as stringent as those of other jurisdictions. For example,
at one time a certain aggressive legislator of Austria called
attention to his fellow members that cats were not taxed. Immediately a law was passed taxing all such animals; the cats
on which a tax was paid would be beribboned whereas those
not ribboned were impounded and if no one appeared to claim
or redeem them they were either sold for taxes or poisoned.
Peter the Great, during his reign recognizing the failing of
men for a hirsute appendage, placed a tax on all beards.
Catherine I was likewise gifted in recognizing these facial
ornaments and decreed that anyone manly enough to exhaust
his patience in caring and curing this superfluous hair should
be doubly taxed in respect to his entire property.
There is still a vast field for improvement in the Revenue
Laws of the State of Colorado. A few years ago the State of
Colorado was considered one of the progressive states in the
field of taxation; but the present laws were enacted in 1902
and very few changes or amendments have been made since
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that time. Possibly we may have some member of the legislature who might abolish all taxes in the years to come and then
some future poet in singing his praises may write:
"He took the tax away
And built for himself an everlasting name."
But until Colorado appoints this poet laureate let us
resign ourselves to the adage that two things are certain,
Death and Taxes.

THE LAYMAN'S VIEW OF A LAWYER
The chief function of a lawyer is to predict for his client
what the court will or would do under given circumstances.
Every lawyer knows this; or, if he gives a little thought to
the point, will acknowledge it, but the layman views the matter
otherwise. Use to him the term "great lawyer" and he sees
Rufus Choate before a jury, or Daniel Webster before the
Supreme Court of the United States. The picture which he
does not see is that before such appearances each of these great
men has been consulted and has given his opinion as to what
the result will be, is likely to be, or ought to be under the facts
as they are detailed to him.
But the function of prediction is more frequently performed to guide the client in his future conduct. This may
be called prediction before the fact, the former prediction
after the fact.
The client who asks advice before he acts gets more value,
and usually for less money, than he who acts and then asks
whether he can win a lawsuit.
Law students often have the layman's view, but a majority
of them are learning that the law is not the career of an orator
but of a prophet.
-John H. Denison.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITORs NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DIC-A to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

ATTACHMENT-LIABILITY OF GARNISHEE-No. 12246-City
of Denver, garnishee, vs. Jones. Decided February4, 1929.
Facts-Mary E. Jones, judgment creditor of the defendant Morris, an employee of the garnishee the City and County
of Denver, attacks the validity of assignments of wages on, the
ground that they violate Section 5110 of the Compiled Laws
of 1921. After the service of garnishment the garnishee paid
the money to the assignee. The testimony showed that the
assignment was ,primarily for the benefit of the assignor and
certain of his creditors.
Held.-That the applicability of the statute to the transactions herein involved depends upon the definition or explanation of things in action set forth in the statute. The
debtor was employed by the garnishee, and wages to be earned
are things in action within the contemplation of the statute
and could be assigned and when assigned would be subject to
the statute here invoked. For that reason the assignments
were void. The contention that the city could not be liable
to the garnishor unless liable to the defendant is subject to an
exception, and only where there is no fraud or the transaction
infringes no established legal principle is the above rule true.
In the instant case the assignment, being primarily for the
benefit of the assignor, under the statute is void.
Judgment Affirmed.
CITATION TO PROBATE-WAIVER-EFFECT-No.

12066-Wil-

son and Wolfe vs. Van Zant, et al--Decided February 18,
1929.
Facts.-Thomas Wolfe died testate. A citation was issued for probate hearing on March 14, 1927, and on that day,
the citation was filed bearing a waiver of notice and consent
to probate, signed by plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs
below. On the same day, Richard Wolfe filed a caveat and
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on March 21 he filed a revocation of his waiver and consent
to probate. On March 28 Kate Wilson filed her revocation
of waiver. The County Court granted this, but refused
Wolfe's and struck his caveat. The demand of both plaintiffs
for a jury was refused and the will was probated.
Held.-The so-called "waivers" did not bar plaintiffs
from contesting the will, because the position of none of the
other parties had been changed, and there was, therefore, no
estoppel. Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.
Judgement Reversed.
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-CHANGE OF BY-LAWS--EsTOPPEL IN

PAl--No. 12028-Farmers Life Insurance Com-

pany vs. Hetherington-DecidedFebruary18, 1929.
Facts.-Hetherington brought this action against the Insurance Company to recover damages for alleged breach of
contract, He was chosen the Company's general counsel
March 5, 1926, and discharged in November, 1926. Prior to
March 5, 1925, the general counsel had been an officer of the
company, holding office for one year, but this office was abolished on that date and the counsel's employment was at the
will of the Board of Directors. In his complaint, Hetherington alleged his employment under the by-law providing for
one year's tenure of office. The answer set forth the change
of March 5, 1925, to which Hetherington filed a replication
claiming that the company was estopped to set up this change,
because the secretary had told Hetherington, in February,
1926, that the original by-law on this point had not been
changed so far as he knew.
Held.-The trial court should not have permitted the case
to go to the jury because the estoppel was not proved. Hetherington had access to the minutes and should not have relied
on the secretary's qualified statement.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
HANDS"-COSTS--No. 12270-Nolan vs.
Lantz Sanitary Laundry Company-Decided February 11,
1929.
Facts.-Nolan entered the Laundry's employ and signed

EQUITY-"CLEAN

DICTA

a contract providing that either party should give two weeks'
notice of the termination of the employment, and that the employee should not enter the business of collecting or soliciting
laundry work for a period of six months after leaving the
Company's employ. The Company discharged Nolan, paying him two weeks' advance wages, which he accepted.
Thereafter, and within six months, he solicited laundry work.
This action was brought to enjoin this violation of the contract.
He filed a cross complaint for $41.27, which the Company
admitted was due and paid into the registry of the Court. No
costs were allowed.
Held.-The receipt by Nolan of advance wages constituted a waiver of any failure by the Company to comply with
the contract. Lower court's ruling on costs was within its
jurisdiction.
Judgment Affirmed.
IRRIGATION DISTRICTS-ASSESSMENTS--No. 11991-San Luis

Valley Irrigation District vs. Noffsinger-Decided February 4, 1929.
Facts.-Noffsinger,-alleging that the district had over his
protest constructed a drainage ditch across his land and in so
doing seized or destroyed portions of his property, brought
this action. The defendant in the court below was an irrigation district. Portions of the land included therein had gone
to seep. It proposed and actually constructed a drainage
ditch, which bisected the plaintiff's land. By reason of the
proximity of the plaintiff's land to the ditch his land -was
completely drained, and he was one of the chief beneficiaries
of the drainage ditch. The plaintiff paid the assessments generally made against all land within the district for the purpose
of said district.
Held.-That the special damages sustained by the plaintiff through the taking of his land were offset by the special
benefits he received in having his land completely drained,
and that the instruction to the effect that benefits to land not
taken should be offset against damages thereto should have
been given by the lower court.
Judgment Reversed.
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CONTRACT
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OWNER-

WAIVER OF LIEN-No. 12053-Armour and Company vs.

McPhee and McGinnity-Decided February 18, 1929.
Facts.-Defendants in error, plaintiffs below, furnished
labor and material for the erection of a building for defendant, for the construction of which one Sullivan was principal
contractor. The bills of the various sub-contractors were not
paid and they brought this action to foreclose their various
liens. The defendant maintains that the lien under the Colorado statute is derivative and not independent.
Defendant recorded this contract with Sullivan, which
refers to certain plans and drawings, but these were not attached. Defendant also claims that a waiver was executed by
Sullivan, purporting to release any claims for liens which he
or any sub-contractor might have against the owner, and that
the Colorado statutory provision invalidating such waivers is
unconstitutional. As to the plaintiff, Midwest Steel and Iron
Works Company, defendant asserts that the fact that its corporate charter had expired destroys its right to maintain this
action in its corporate name.
Held.-It is immaterial whether the lien is derivative or
independent because the paper -recorded by defendant is insufficient in that the plans are not included. All the work and
labor are, therefore, deemed to have been done at the instance
of the owner and it is unnecessary to decide the constitutionality of the statute regarding the waivers. The contract with
Midwest Steel and Iron Works Company was made during
the corporate life of this company and after the expiration of
the charter the contractors, either in the name of the company
or as trustees, may maintain this action.
Judgment Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-DEFENSE-PLEADINc---No. 11993-Riel

and Riel vs. Schwalb and Cannon-Decided February 18,
1929.
Facts.-Schwalb and Cannon sued Riel and Riel on a
promissory note.

Defendants' answer alleged that they had

given their note for $2,000.00 to The Home Savings and Merchants Bank long before July 13, 1925; that on July 6, 1925,
this bank consolidated with The Globe National Bank, through
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fraud and deceit; that plaintiffs were directors of The Home
Savings and Merchants Bank and knew of all the fraud practiced in the merger and in dealing with their notes; that about
July 6, 1925, the Home Savings Bank and Merchants Bank
sold the $2,000.00 note to another bank; that on July 13, 1925,
defendants executed a renewal note (the one now in question)
on the Globe Bank's representation that it held the old note;
that the merged banks failed on September 19, 1925; that defendants had money on deposit in the Globe Bank sufficient
to pay this note, on which they received dividends of $700.00,
which they have offered to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs took this
note without consideration, after maturity, and with full
knowledge of its infirmities. The trial court sustained a demurrer to this answer.
Held.-The answer states a good defense.
Judgment Reversed with Directions to Overrule the Demurrer.
12045
-Slife vs. Credit Finance Corporation-DecidedFebruary
11, 1929.
Facts.-The Corporation sued Slife on a note for $500.00,
dated January 16, 1926, payable $50.00 per month beginning
February 16, 1926, with interest at 1% per month after maturity, and providing for 15% attorney's fees. Fifty dollars
was deducted from principal as the first ten months' interest.
Default was made February 16, 1926, and this matured the
note. Lower Court allowed 1% per month from that date,
together with attorney's fees.
Held.-The $50.00 deducted in advance paid the interest
until November 16, 1926, and additional allowance of interest
was error.
Judgment Modified and Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-INTEREST-ATTORNEY'S FEEs--No.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRACTICE-No.

12236-Colo-

rado Fuel & Iron Co. vs. Industrial Commission-Decided
February 4, 1929.
Facts.-Various hearings were held before the referee,
and the matter was continued from time to time for the purpose of determining the compensation, if any, due the claim-
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ant. The Commission finally ordered that compensation be denied. Nothing further was done in the case for some time until
a letter was written to the Commission in behalf of the claimant calling attention to an alleged injustice done the claimant
and asking that the case be re-opened. The Commission
caused notice to be served upon the claimant and the company
that a further hearing would be had. The company objected
on the ground that there had been a final order entered, and
that no petition for review was filed, and there was no reason
assigned by the commission for re-opening of the case. Nevertheless the hearing proceeded and an award was made. The
company filed its petition to review and the former award was
affirmed. Thereupon the Company commenced this action in
the District Court.
Held.-That under Section 4484 of the Compiled Laws
of 1921 the Commission on its own motion on the ground of
error or a change in conditions may re-open the case, and it
is not required that the commission set forth in its order in
reopening the case any cause or reason therefor. To reverse
this case would require that it be sent back to the Commission
for further proceedings, and as substantial justice was finally
done by the commission after the re-opening of the case it
would be useless to return the case to it. There was sufficient
evidence upon which the Commission could have found that
the claimant was entitled to the award.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REFEREE'S FINDING OF FACT-

No. 12112-Industrial Commission and Colorado Fuel &
Iron Co. vs. Robinson-DecidedFebruary18, 1929.
Facts.-Robinson filed a workman's notice of claim for
compensation in 1921, and alleged that he accidentally sustained injuries, arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Company. After a long series of hearings the
Referee of the Industrial Commission found as a fact that
Robinson's disability was caused by sciatica, and entered an
award in favor of the Company. The District Court reversed
this ruling.
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Held.-There is a little evidence to support the referee's
finding of fact, and it was, therefore, error for the District
Court to reverse the award.
Judgment Reversed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDToR's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interestinj decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No.

7858-UnitedStates v.

Broadmoor Hotel Company-J. Foster Symes, Judge.
Facts.-Defendant, at its hotel, gives tea dances which
are open to the public as well as guests. A table d'hote charge
of seventy-five cents is made for tea, which is the uniform
charge throughout the hotel, whether music and dancing are
available or not. Those attending may occupy chairs and
tables but are under no obligation to order refreshments, nor
is there any cover or entrance charge.
The Government alleges the tax prescribed by Sec.
800(a), Subdiv. 6 of the Rev. Act of 1918, approved February 24, 1919, and Sec. 800(a), Subdiv. 5 of the Rev. Act of
1921* is applicable to these facts, and seeks to recover the
tax and penalties for the years 1919 to 1924 inclusive.
Held.-The language of the sections in question imports
something more than the furnishing by the hotel of agreeable surroundings and music by an orchestra, and it is contemplated that the entertainment be conducted for profit and
admission charged. Here the charge of seventy-five cents is
not an excessive one for the tea, and there is no direct profit.
The Sections call for something that might be termed
entertainment, as distinguished from the mere service of food
in the manner and with the accessories customary and expected
by patrons of a hotel of the character of that of defendants.
*These sections are identical and read as follows: "A tax of II2 cents for
each ten cents or fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any public
performance for profit at any roof garden, cabaret, or other similar entertainment, to
which the charge for admission is wholly or in part included in the price paid for
refreshment, service or merchandise; the amount paid for such admission to be
deemed to be 20 per centum of the amount paid for refreshment, service and merchandise; such tax to be paid by the person paying for such refreshment, service or
merchandise."
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The term "cabaret" denotes something more in the way of
entertainment than is found in this situation; here no professional dancers or actors were hired by the hotel, and the music
did not include soloists, either instrumental or vocal.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No. 5 9 8 5 -In the Matter
of The Colorado Farms Company, Bankrupt-J. Foster
Symes, Judge.
Facts.-On June 30th, 1928, the Referee in Bankruptcy
ordered the sale of 278 parcels of farm lands owned by the
bankrupt to be sold free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, the liens of encumbrancers to attach to the proceeds
to be realized from the sale. The sale was held August 2nd,
and on August 14th an order was entered by the Referee approving the sale of certain of the parcels. Subsequently The
International Trust Company, Trustee, and The Colorado
National Bank, Trustee, each filed petitions for the application of the proceeds of the sales of the real estate in which
they were respectively interested, asking among other things
that the fees of the Trustee and Referee in Bankruptcy,
amounting to a total of 2% of the sale proceeds, be found not
to be a charge against the sale proceeds, but a charge against
the general estate of the bankrupt. The Referee disqualified
himself to hear the petitions insofar- as the fee question was
involved, and referred the question to the Judge of the District Court for decision.
Held.-That the fees and commissions of the Referee and
Trustee in Bankruptcy in connection with the sales mentioned
in the petitions could not be charged against the proceeds of
these sales. The Court did not decide whether these fees
should be a charge against the general estate of the bankrupt.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended in 1903, provided:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
from estates which they have administered such commissions on all
moneys disbursed by them as may be allowed by the courts, not to exceed six
per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, * * * and one per centum
on moneys in excess of ten thousand dollars.
*

*

*
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This was changed in 1910 to read:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
* •such commissions on all moneys disbursed or turned over to any person,
including lienholders, by them, as may be allowed by the courts, etc.

The commissions allowed to referees are the same as the
commissions allowed to trustees in bankruptcy.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, in In
re Harralson,179 Fed. 490, construing the Bankruptcy Act as
amended in 1903, held that under no circumstances was the
trustee or referee entitled to commissions to be paid from the
proceeds of the sale of encumbered assets, on the theory that
the sale is for the benefit, not of the lienholder, but of the
general estate, and that therefore these commissions should be
paid out of the general estate.
It was decided by the District Court in the present case
that the 1910 amendment, adding the words "or turned over
to any person, including lienholders," did not change the
source of payment of the trustee's and referee's commissions,
but concerned only the amount of the commissions.
100,864-Colorado NationalBank v. Rehbein et al-JudgeHenry Bray.
Facts.-Rehbein, on December 28, 1923, signed a note for
$3,000, payable to Louis Siener in three years and secured by
deed of trust on certain property. Siener pledged the note
with the bank as collateral for a loan of $3,000 to himself. A
few months later Fred Giggals and Edith Giggals bought the
property above from Mrs. Rehbein, the Giggals assuming the
payment of the note and deed of trust. On December 28,
1926, the date of maturity, the Giggals, wishing to pay off the
note, gave a deed of trust for $3,000 to the Capitol Life Insurance Company, which $3,000 was paid to Louis A. Siener, who
gave a forged copy of the note therefor, and also a request for
the release of the deed of trust. This release was executed by
the Public Trustee. The release, and the mortgage to the
Capitol Life Insurance Company, were recorded on the same
day, but the release was by inadvertence recorded five minutes
after the mortgage. On the same day, namely, the date of
maturity, Siener told the bank that the note had been extended
and, with their consent, wrote an extension on the back of the
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note. He had previously endorsed the interest payments as
each became due. Over a year later Siener was arrested for
other crimes and the situation was disclosed. The bank
brought an action to foreclose and for the amount of the note,
against Rehbein, the Giggals and the Insurance Company.
The chief defenses were as follows:
(1) The bank was negligent in allowing Siener to collect interest, endorse payments, extend the note, and endorse
the extension, without the bank notifying the maker that
Siener was no longer holder or inquiring whether the note was
really extended.
(2)
The bank, by the above omissions, was estopped
from denying Siener's agency to collect the principal.
(3)
The note was avoided by a material alteration made
with the bank's consent and without the assent of the maker.
(4) The Capitol Life Insurance Company claimed
that they were purchasers relying upon the release of the deed
of trust by the Public Trustee.
Held.-Judgment in favor of defendants on all points,
particularly on the ground of the bank's negligence.
The Court considered that, although none of the parties
had committed any wrong, the plaintiff bank had placed its
confidence in Siener throughout, whereas the defendants, and
particularly the Giggals, who bought the property and made
payments of interest and were personally present when Siener
received the principal, were not careless or negligent and
should not suffer loss, and that it would be inequitable to set
aside the release obtained by reason of the payment to Siener.
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